Egypt’s relationship with Hamas has been shaky. Since the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) President Muhammad Morsi by now President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the country has taken a harder line against Hamas. But is his hard line actually too hard?
Recent court decisions in Egypt have defined Hamas formally as a terrorist organization. In response, Hamas has accused Egypt of collusion with Israel to reinforce “the occupation,” and openly threatened Cairo over the move.
I asked Zack Gold of the Institute of National Security Studies if El-Sisi ‘s rougher treatment of Hamas has been beneficial to Israel, or actually caused some backfire by forcing Hamas to longer trust Egypt as a mediator.
“That is a very good question. We’ve seen how Egyptian pressure on Hamas can impact Israeli security. Everyone agrees – including the Israeli security establishment – on the need to rebuild Gaza. But rebuilding Gaza requires Egypt’s cooperation. Without Cairo, it will lead to the next war.”
Specifically, President El-Sisi’s tough rhetoric might force Hamas to continue relying on Qatar and Turkey as a mediator or broker, countries with which Israel does not have good relations. Egypt, by contrast, has tended to lean toward Israel’s positions in ceasefire negotiations, making the terms advantageous to Jerusalem. That mediation might now be a thing of the past for future wars.
“His rhetoric is going to drive Hamas away. They could say, ‘That’s it! You’re no longer a mediator.’ It is possible they are being pushed harder than Israel wants. Egypt’s bias against Hamas is advantageous to Israel, but being this biased Egypt loses its leverage on Gaza’s rulers to behave rationally. We saw that in 2014.”
Some in Israel might argue for the need to have higher intensity conflict with Hamas to undercut its strength. But Gold noted that neither Israel nor Hamas chose the timing of either Operation Protective Edge or Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. At every effort a desperate Hamas made to end the fight, Egypt dragged its feet. Despite this being perceived as very strong support for Israel, it had an effect that might have hurt Israel strategically.
“In 2012, Egypt was aligned with Hamas. They wanted to end things sooner. The longer it (Operation Protective Edge) went, the more it seemed Egypt was aligned with Israel. It was not a problem last year because of the public pressure already on Hamas in Egypt, but in the future it could be a problem” with Egypt to be so closely aligned with the Jewish State.
Gold went on to say that many analysts saw it that “Egypt was ready to crush Hamas down to the last Israeli soldier.” When asked if that meant Egypt saw it as a chance to weaken Israel, as if it were an enemy, Gold characterized it differently.
“It’s more that Egypt is a wary ally. They are very happy to let Israel take all the responsibility and the flak for what Egypt is not willing to do itself.”
Does Egypt actually view Hamas as a threat though? Will Hamas launch real operations against Egypt? For years, Egyptian media has blamed a number of plots and attacks on Hamas interference, even though according to Gold it is very difficult to uncover concrete evidence for such a link.
“The real armed threat is questionable but Egypt perceives it as real. Hamas gets regularly blamed for things they might not be involved in.”
On whether Hamas might be linked to arms smuggling to rebels in the Sinai (who are affiliated with ISIS), Gold says it all comes down to crushing the Muslim Brotherhood.
“Cairo views Hamas through the prism of the MB. They are out to counter all their affiliates, and the Palestinian affiliate happens to be Hamas.”
On whether the court decisions were El-Sisi’s way of ratcheting up pressure on Hamas, Gold had this to add:
“On these court rulings, political leaders will decide whether or not they want to follow them. We still see that Musa Muhammad Abu Marzuk (Hamas’ Deputy Political Chief) still operates in Cairo, even though the courts have ruled against their activity in the past.”